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The last thirty years has witnessed a striking volume and diversity of academic enquiry in the 
field of executive remuneration. In this paper, we offer a review of the literature on particular 
aspects of executive pay, centring on the nature of the pay-performance relationship, 
principally as evidenced by empirical studies of executive pay in the UK and USA, but also 
embracing related themes of enquiry. 
The review is organised as follows. By way of context, we begin by explaining briefly the 
structure of pay in UK corporations and its evolution over the last three decades. We then 
outline how the processes by which pay arrangements are established and overseen within 
companies have changed and note the increased transparency in the reporting of pay since 
the 1980s. This leads to a discussion of the forces which motivated the sustained surge in 
the empirical study of pay from the mid-1980s in terms of factors such as the turbulence of 
pay structures, the emergence of corporate governance as an area of academic enquiry and 
the tension between alternative theoretical perspectives on remuneration. The main body of 
the review begins with a consideration of the economic researcher’s perspective on 
executive pay, where outcomes are seen as shaped by competing concepts and influences 
such as optimal contracting on the one hand and rent extraction on the other, as well as 
factors such as firm size, complexity and performance. These forces interact in a market 
framework characterised by various imperfections, and most importantly the market’s 
inability to reliably observe executive talent, at least on an ex ante basis. In the core of the 
literature review which follows, we focus on the pay-performance relationship which 
dominates the body of empirical work, and explain the principal alternative measures 
explored, pay performance sensitivity and pay performance elasticity. We review the most 
significant contributions and identify a number of key moderating variables which have 
emerged as influential in the empirical relationship. These include the impact of institutional 
ownership, the influence of boards, directors’ networks, the role of external pay consultants 
and increased shareholder activism. These factors enable us to see the pay-performance 
relationship within a wider governance context. 
A notable feature of the literature as a whole is the absence of strong consensus in terms of 
the pay-performance relationship, a factor explained both in terms of the vagaries and 
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inefficiencies of the executive labour market and the diversity of methods employed by 
academic researchers in exploring it. 
The review concludes by identifying how the dominant focus on the pay-performance 
relationship has, in recent years, given way to a more varied empirical agenda on executive 
pay. We highlight the main emergent themes and suggest that they constitute a strong 
platform for a rich and sustainable research programme.  
 
Executive Pay, Pay Setting Processes and Pay Transparency in the UK: Structure and 
Evolution 
In this section, by way of context, we explain how the components of executive reward, the 
processes involved in deciding remuneration arrangements and the transparency of pay 
have changed over the period covered by this literature review. We also explain the 
coincidence of factors which led to a sea-change in executive compensation in the UK from 
the mid -1980s, and which, in turn, define the starting point for our review. 
Contemporary practice in relation to the compensation of UK executives invariably embodies 
a range of reward components; principally salary, annual bonus, various forms of stock-
based compensation such as executive share options and long-term incentive plans, 
pension entitlement and sundry in-kind benefits or perquisites. Whilst some of these 
elements, notably salary and annual bonus, are long-established, stock-based compensation 
has emerged and developed as a significant feature only in the last thirty years. During this 
period, however, it has frequently accounted for a majority share of the reward of senior 
executives, with an often transformative impact on the level of individual executives’ pay. 
Indeed, the emergence of stock-based compensation alone has motivated much of the 
empirical investigation of executive pay, as researchers seek, in particular, to understand the 
impact of its use on the pay-performance relationship. What is particularly striking about the 
impact of stock-based compensation over the last three decades is that, by contrast, the 
period from 1945 through to the early-mid 1980s was one of notable stability in terms of pay 
components and steady but essentially incremental change in pay levels.  
The last thirty years have also witnessed radical change in the pay-setting arrangements 
within UK corporations. The 1980s saw the gradual adoption of remuneration, or 
compensation, committees in large UK corporations, though  Conyon (1997) observes that 
by 1990 around 58% of leading firms had yet to establish such a committee, a figure broadly 
supported by Main and Johnston (1992).  Where remuneration committees did operate, they 
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were invariably populated by a mix of executive and non-executive directors, with the former, 
of course, having direct input into decisions on their own remuneration. Conyon (1997) 
observed that in 1995, of 287 board committees surveyed, only marginally fewer than half 
still featured executive representation. Since the mid-nineties, a major trend has been the 
distancing of the executive group from the pay-setting process with the increasing 
independence of remuneration committees in establishing pay levels and structures, 
recognising the obvious conflict of interest in earlier arrangements.  
Finally, in setting the context for our review, it is important to note that there is now generally 
much greater transparency of executive reward than existed thirty years ago. In the mid-
1980s, researchers in the field of executive remuneration were forced either to make heroic 
assumptions regarding levels and forms of executive pay, or to invest significant resource in 
the detailed retrieval of pay data which were often embedded in unpublished corporate 
documents or records. For example, as the use of stock-based compensation increased, at 
first via the executive share option (ESO), details of awards and holdings were only available 
via registers of directors’ interests, where unevenness of reporting protocol required 
significant and careful interpretation in order to reveal details of individual holdings and their 
value. Following the Greenbury Committee’s endorsement of more bespoke, relative 
performance arrangements for stock-based compensation such as long-term incentive plans 
(LTIPs), a further challenge was to reveal the identity of companies selected for peer group 
comparison of performance, details which companies were often reluctant to make public. 
Successive governance-related reports, changes to stock exchange listing requirements and 
governance codes of practice have served to improve the transparency of pay structures 
and processes, but there remains an issue regarding the availability of reliable and 
comprehensive data, with disclosure requirements and conventions tending to lag behind 
successive innovations in pay component. A particular difficulty in sourcing reliable data has 
been the practice whereby executives’ rewards are grouped for reporting purposes, which 
confounds individual calculations. This has meant that many studies have used, as the focus 
for their work, the experience of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) for whom more explicit 
and detailed disclosure has tended to be available, rather than broader scrutiny of 
experience across the board as a whole.    
 
The mid-1980s: a watershed in executive pay 
The mid-1980s have already been described as a period during which there were significant 
changes in the nature and components of, and processes relating to, executive pay. This 
section begins by explaining how a combination of factors operating during this period 
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created a context and incentive for change, which then initiated an era of vigorous activity in 
the executive pay arena. This, in turn, fuelled an unprecedented interest in issues around 
executive reward, which engaged academic researchers as well as the practitioner, 
shareholder, regulatory and policymaking communities, and the wider public. 
As noted above, the most significant change to compensation arrangements in UK firms was 
the arrival of stock-based compensation in the form of the ESO, the British variant of the 
American stock option. Its uptake in the UK reflected a growing awareness of the 
competitive nature of the international executive market and the need to replicate aspects of 
US practice which meant that US packages were typically significantly more valuable than 
UK equivalents. The appeal of the ESO as a pay component was fuelled by both a buoyant 
equity market and, for a short period, by the introduction of tax advantages in the 1984 
Finance Act, which allowed recipients to take advantage of the differential between higher 
rate income tax and capital gains tax in managing tax exposure to option-related gains. 
Inevitably, the arrival of a new pay component caught the attention of academic researchers 
who sought to explore its impact on both pay levels and the pay-performance relationship. 
Empirical investigation was stimulated by the emergence of quite distinct and competing 
theoretical lenses which invited the view that pay innovations were principally motivated by, 
alternatively, executive self-interest or a desire to promote greater alignment between the 
interests of executives and shareholders. These competing insights are discussed more 
extensively below. Executive share options also attracted media attention, with reports of 
unprecedented levels of option-related reward associated with leading industry figures such 
as Ralph Halpern of the Burton Group and Cedric Brown of British Gas. This latter case 
attracted public concern that executives of newly-privatised concerns were profiting 
disproportionately from the sale of state assets. The privatisation programme of the early 
eighties also had the effect of raising public awareness and experience of shareholding and 
of the concept and practical features of corporate governance. Concerns over the effect of 
new pay components and the processes for setting pay were already being expressed in the 
1980s, led by the institutional shareholding community and couched within the wider context 
of the health of UK corporate governance. These concerns were to give rise to a stream of 
quasi-official enquiries and reports throughout the 1990s and beyond, which concerned 
themselves with the broader architecture of governance, but with a particular focus on the 
composition and determinants of pay.  In many respects, therefore, the mid-eighties marked 
the divide between an era of stability and continuity in the structure of pay and pay-setting 
arrangements, and an era of significant turbulence in terms of pay components and levels, 
and pay determination. The following thirty years would see continuous change in the 
relative significance of pay components, driven by new pay instruments, followship, 
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changing regulatory arrangements and the shifting fortunes of the equity market. The mid-
1980s therefore marked a turning point in awareness of and interest in executive pay and 
the issues surrounding it.    
 
The CEO labour market, optimal contracting, and rent-extraction   
This section offers a brief introduction to the theoretical perspectives and insights, 
developed by academic economists, which frame the field of empirical enquiry into executive 
reward in general. As such, it sets the context for the discussion of the pay-performance 
literature which follows. It also acknowledges that whilst the pay-performance focus, fuelled 
especially by academic and wider interest in the possible absence of a link, is an important 
empirical theme, it forms just one strand of enquiry within a much larger field of research. 
Optimal contracting theories suggest that an idealised, competitive and efficient 
market would result in pay arrangements for CEOs and other senior executives that reflect a 
complex set of factors: the marginal products of managerial effort (jointly determined by 
talent and experience, the size of the firm that employs the CEO and the complexity of its 
business); the `noise-to-signal’ ratio of the performance measure (pay for performance is 
less relevant when performance measures are less reliable); as well as the individual’s 
wealth, risk aversion, the proximity to retirement, and other factors that could affect the 
opportunity costs of working elsewhere.  
Since senior executive decisions affect the entire firm, talent has greatest effect in 
larger firms where it can be “rolled out” or “leveraged” to achieve economies of scale. Theory 
suggests that, if CEO talent were freely observable and markets were fully competitive, 
rational firms competing for talent would pay their CEOs just enough to prevent them from 
being poached by relatively smaller competitors. The arms-length bargaining between CEOs 
and firms would ensure that the top talents would be employed by the largest firms, where 
talent is most productive - an economically efficient outcome (Gabaix and Landier, 2008; 
Tervio, 2008). As a result, a relatively small dispersion in talent could, potentially, justify 
large pay differences between the top earners and the rest, an outcome readily observed in 
the US, UK, and internationally. Another straightforward prediction of the perfect market is 
that a one percent across-the-board increase in the market capitalisation of all firms in the 
country should result in a one percent increase in average CEO pay as the competition for 
talent intensifies.  
While this idealized market might deviate in detail from the actual operation of 
executive labour markets, it nevertheless helps explain a number of key empirical 
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regularities. Consistent with the market-based theory of pay, Gabaix and Landier (2008) 
found that the six-fold increase in U.S. CEO pay since 1980 can be explained by the six-fold 
growth in firm size over the same period. Kaplan and Rauh (2010) report that the recent 
growth in US CEO pay is not inconsistent with  income trends among top performers in other 
professional occupations that are characterised by strong economies of scale in talent such 
as venture capital fund managers, corporate lawyers, professional athletes, and celebrities. 
In short, available empirical literature is not inconsistent with the suggestion that the recent 
well-documented growth in average CEO pay has been mostly driven by perfectly legitimate 
factors to do with market demand for “scalable” talent.  
It is, of course, unlikely that the CEO labour market is fully efficient and perfectly 
competitive. The literature suggests a number of important limitations to the optimal-
contracting view. First, executive labour markets lack transparency: boards of directors are 
usually insufficiently informed of the availability of all potential candidates and, generally, 
CEO talent is not easily measurable. Tervio (2009) argues that in many professional 
activities, including top management, talent is naturally scarce, and the labour market fails to 
discover most of the available talent. It is costly to experiment with first-time CEOs. To the 
extent that ‘discovered’ talents quickly become public knowledge, competitors are expected 
to free-ride on talent discovery by poaching successful first-time CEOs from the firms that 
‘discovered’ them. The end result is that firms play it safe, by bidding up the wages of the 
revealed pool of incumbent CEOs, rather than by experimenting with new talents as often as 
would be socially efficient. This form of market inefficiency is particularly worrying, as studies 
that have tried to calibrate CEO talent empirically find relatively little implied variation in 
ability among top CEOs (Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Tervio, 2008; Jung and Subramanian, 
2015).  
Secondly, empirical research finds substantial evidence to suggest that incumbent 
CEOs in some cases are able to exert undue influence over the pay-setting process for their 
own financial interest. Individual research papers that report empirical evidence in support of 
the suggestion that more powerful CEOs (vis-à-vis their boards) enjoy higher levels of pay 
are almost too many to mention. In a recent meta-analysis of CEO pay literature, van Essen, 
Otten, and Carberry (2015) reviewed the results of 219 U.S.-based executive pay studies 
published between 1962 and 2009 and concluded that the weight of the empirical evidence 
suggests overwhelmingly that CEO power and, in particular, CEO-Chairman duality, is 
positively associated with CEO pay. A particularly suspect pay practice that has received 
considerable attention both in the academic literature and in the press is that of “option 
backdating” – the practice of opportunistic (retroactive) timing of executive stock option 
grants, knowingly or otherwise authorised by corporate boards. Empirical research suggests 
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that the practice of option backdating was widespread in the 1990s and early 2000s in the 
US and had the ability to deliver significant gain to the eligible executives (Lie, 2005; 
Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer, 2010). Consistent with a view that option backdating is a 
manifestation of other, deeper, agency problems, Frankforter, Becton, Stanwick, and 
Coleman (2012) find that firms with active nomination and compensation committees have a 
lower likelihood of option backdating. Perhaps not surprisingly, stock prices reacted 
negatively to news on option backdating investigations by the SEC. Efendi, Files, Ouyang, 
and Swanson (2013) document higher forced turnover rates for CEOs and CFOs following 
option backdating allegations, and Ertimur, Ferri, and Maber (2012) report related reputation 
penalties for the non-executive members of compensation committees for their role in poor 
oversight of executive pay.  
Thirdly, a small but growing number of studies emphasises governance externalities: 
weakly governed firms impose a cost on other firms by bidding up CEO pay (Acharya and 
Volpin, 2010, Dicks, 2012). As firms compete for scarce CEO talent, the resulting rent 
transfers over and above arm’s-length-contracted pay are most likely to accrue to the CEOs 
of the largest firms. To the extent that a well-paid CEO “makes the company look strong”, an 
upward bias in executive pay may also stem from corporate myopia. In a plausible scenario 
studied by Hayes and Schaefer (2009), myopic firms that value short-term share price 
performance have incentives to distort the CEO wage upward in order to temporarily 
increase the market perception of the firms’ outlook and value. Hayes and Schaefer show 
that wage distortion is an equilibrium outcome if the level of corporate myopia is sufficiently 
high.  
An alternative and, arguably, competing theory of CEO pay that summarises some of 
the concerns outlined above is proposed by Bebchuk and Fried (2004). The rent-extraction 
theory of CEO pay asserts that both internal (firm-specific) and external (market-based) 
mechanisms of corporate governance are too weak as to ensure arm’s-length contracting 
over CEO pay. Powerful CEOs are expected to maintain their control over the board by 
selecting and retaining board members with experience on passive, compliant boards and by 
excluding those with experience in more active and challenging boards, potentially altering 
the nature of the labour market for executives and non-executives alike (Zajac and 
Westphal, 1996). The central prediction of the rent-extraction theory is the notion of “pay 
camouflage” - the tendency of powerful CEOs and weak boards to distort pay schemes in 
order to camouflage the total cost of the package and hence manage the risk of public 
“outrage”. Bruce and Skovoroda (2013) study the structure and the determinants of CEO 
bonus awards in the UK financial sector immediately prior to the financial crisis of 2008/09 
and document a general tendency for greater complexity in scheme design in terms of the 
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award criteria. They find strong evidence that bonus payouts are linked to firms’ profitability, 
in accordance with the optimal contracting view. On the other hand, complex bonus 
structures are associated with higher bonus payouts after the effects of firm performance 
and size are appropriately accounted for - thereby lending some weight to the executive 
power argument in the UK context.  
The rent-extraction theory of CEO pay and the demand-for-talent story, of course, 
are not mutually exclusive. In a recent review, Frydman and Jenter (2010) argue that no 
single theory of CEO pay is fully consistent with the empirical data. Where possible, a 
framework that brings the competing theories together is therefore desirable. Van Essen, 
Otten, and Carberry report that the share of variance in CEO pay explained by CEO power 
indicators is qualitatively similar to the share of variance explained by firm performance 
(more on pay-performance link later) in the sense that both effects explain relatively little. 
They conclude that “firm size is far more important for explaining CEO compensation.” This 
is, arguably, the most robust empirical finding in pay research to date, consistent over a very 
large number of individual studies.   
This brings us to a very important point in this debate. As discussed above, the ability 
of the optimal contracting theories to rationalize firm size effect in CEO pay (the effect that is, 
empirically, very large) is based on market ability to reliably measure and “sort” “scalable” 
CEO talent. Yet, we know very little about labour market efficiency in identifying talented 
CEOs. Indeed, devising a controlled scientific experiment that would be able to sort those 
CEOs who are indeed paid for their contribution to firm value from those who are most 
definitely overpaid is challenging and, generally, impossible. The only “experiments” 
available to the researches are “natural” experiments where the experimental and control 
conditions are determined by nature, yet where the process that governs the assignment 
across the “treatment” and “control” groups is random or close to being random. Recently, 
Nguyen and Nielsen (2014) published the results of a natural (albeit tragic) experiment on 
the link between CEO pay and firm performance. Nguyen and Nielsen analysed stock price 
reactions to sudden deaths of executives in the US (mostly CEOs and CFOs). The paper 
identified 149 sudden deaths of US executives from natural causes such as strokes and 
accidents between 1991 and 2008. The analysis shows that the market reaction to the 
events of the sudden deaths is significantly more negative for those executives who were 
expected to receive larger compensations (measured relatively to firm size). This finding 
lends support to the talent-based explanation of CEO pay, as the evidence suggests that the 
stock market’s valuation and the boards’ valuation of CEO contribution to their firms are 
correlated. Further evidence suggests that an average executive retains between 70 % and 
80 % of the marginal rent. In contrast, the firm (i.e. the shareholders) only keep 20 % to 30 
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% of the marginal rent. The question remains: does this apparently uneven rent split reflect 
the relative scarcity of available talent on the one hand, or is it symptomatic of increasingly 
complex pay camouflage strategies, myopic corporate boards and stock markets suffering 
from asymmetric information problems on the other?  
This section has demonstrated that the tension inherent in this and related issues 
continues to command the attention of academic economists. It will be observed in the 
following section that within the body of empirical literature on the pay-performance issue, 
both theoretical traditions are able to point to support for their positions. 
 
The Pay-Performance Literature 
CEOs are often responsible for complex and non-routine tasks such as leading the 
development and implementation of the firm’s investment strategy and assessing the 
principal risks facing the firm.  To the extent that direct monitoring of CEO effort and 
effectiveness in shareholder value creation is costly or unfeasible, agency theory advocates 
the use of incentive contracts where CEO pay is tied explicitly to firm performance. In 
practice, CEO personal wealth is linked to firm performance through annual bonuses, share 
ownership, and various form of equity-based pay: restricted share schemes, share (stock) 
option plans, performance share plans, or long-term incentive plans. Frydman and Jenter 
(2010) report that the share of the performance-based component in total pay across U.S.-
based CEOs has been on the rise since the 1970s. In 2008, a typical S&P 500 CEO had 
about 78 % of his or her total pay linked to performance and, potentially, “under risk” if the 
firm does not perform well. Similarly, performance-related pay of a typical CEO of a large 
UK-based company makes up about 70% of total pay (Renneboog and Zhao, 2011). 
However, as we will see from the research reviewed below, not all pay components that are, 
supposedly, performance-related are equally good at creating a robust pay-performance link 
in practice.  
Viewed as an instrument of incentive alignment and a key prediction of agency 
theory, it is unsurprising that the sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance has been 
studied intensively over the past two to three decades. Methodologically, the link between 
pay and performance is usually measured by two closely related measures: pay-
performance sensitivity (PPS), which shows the absolute increment to pay associated with a 
$ 1,000 increase in shareholder value, and pay-performance elasticity (PPE), which shows 
the percentage change in pay associated with a 1 % increase in shareholder value, see 
Murphy (1999). In terms of performance measures, the literature both uses accounting-
based measures such as return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), and market-
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based performance indicators such as Total Shareholder Return (TSR) and the market value 
of the assets relative to book value, or Tobin’s Q.     
Early empirical studies focused almost exclusively on the sensitivity of cash pay, i.e. 
salary and annual bonus, to changes in performance and collectively suggested that the 
sensitivity is quite small (Rosen, 1992; Conyon and Gregg, 1994). Typical estimates at the 
time suggested that firms pay their CEOs between one and one and a half percent more in 
salary and bonuses for a ten percent rise in shareholder value – arguably, a very modest 
reward for a fantastic financial result. Not only were empirically estimated sensitivities of 
cash pay to performance disappointingly low, they also seemed to vary across different 
studies and different samples of firms. While some studies reported relatively stronger pay-
performance correlations (Belliveau, O’Reilly and Wade, 1996), others reported pay-
performance sensitivities that were economically and statistically negligible.  
The estimates of cash pay sensitivity, as the measure of incentive strength, are 
incomplete in the sense that they ignore equity-based pay. Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
followed Forbes’ compensation surveys published between 1974 and 1986 and showed that, 
even in the 1980s when stock options and CEO equity holdings were not as ubiquitous as 
they are now, most of the pay-performance link that could potentially affect CEO decision 
making was generated by equity-based pay and by accumulated holdings of firms’ shares, 
and not by annual bonuses. More precisely, CEO firm-related wealth is directly affected by 
the value of share options granted in the year, by the changes in value of unexercised 
options granted in the previous years, and by the changes in value of CEO shareholdings. 
Hall and Liebman (1998) further documented the key role of equity-based pay and, in 
particular, the effect that the remarkable growth in option grants had on incentive pay in the 
1990s. Using a sample of 478 large US-based firms and the pay data from 1980 to 1994, 
Hall and Liebman reported, broadly in agreement with prior studies, that firms pay their 
CEOs about 2.2 percent more in salary and bonuses for a ten percent rise in shareholder 
value. In contrast, when year-to-year changes in value of CEOs’ holdings of options and 
shares are taken into account and are added to the annual cash pay figure (or, subtracted 
from cash pay when CEO equity holdings are losing value), this broad measure of CEO 
income flow from cash and equity combined is remarkably sensitive to stock price. Research 
suggested that for a typical (median) CEO in the sample, a hypothetical scenario where 
shareholder return goes up by 10 percentage points would yield a 39 percent increase in the 
annual income flow from cash pay and equity combined! Hall and Liebman’s analysis also 
suggested that, by this measure, the total elasticity of CEO pay to firm market value rose by 
more than 200 percent between 1980 and 1994 due to the increased use of option grants as 
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they conclude emphatically “Are CEOs paid like bureaucrats? Our evidence suggests that 
the answer is no”.  
UK pay data and research at the time were telling a very similar story. Using a 
sample of 1,000 UK-based companies and a time period from 1984 to 1995, Benito and 
Conyon (1999) reported that UK firms pay their CEOs about 2.6 percent more in salary and 
bonuses for a ten percent rise in shareholder value – the result qualitatively similar to that of 
Hall and Liebman. Similarly to the US studies, and in support of the incentive alignment 
view, those pay studies that took into account CEOs’ holdings of share options and, later, 
restricted stock, reported much higher levels of pay-performance elasticity (Buck, Bruce, 
Main, and Udueni, 2003; Main, Bruce, and Buck, 1996). Main et al’s estimations for the 
highest paid director suggested that a ten percent rise in shareholder value yielded an 8.94 
percent increase in the annual income flow from cash and from unexercised options 
combined (where option evaluations used Black-Scholes approximations). Overall, empirical 
results by Hall and Liebman (1998), Main et al (1996), and others clearly contradicted the 
claims that there was no correlation between pay and performance. Evidence suggests that 
the share of the pay-performance link generated by long-term compensation such as equity- 
and shareholdings was on the rise and, by the mid-nineties, it had dwarfed the pay-
performance link generated by annual bonuses. 
Tosi, Werner, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia (2000) provided the first meta-analytical study 
of the growing empirical literature on performance pay, which summarized and assessed 
results across different methodologies and datasets. In part, as a reflection of the dominant 
methodology that focused exclusively on the determinants of cash pay (salary and bonuses), 
the meta-analysis suggested that only 4% of the observed variance in CEO pay could be 
explained by changes in firm performance.  Firm size factors, on the other hand, were found 
to be explaining about 90% of the variance. Pay researchers took this as evidence that 
“average” pay-performance estimates masked important heterogeneity across firms – if 
different firms pay their CEOs differently, pay for performance could be relatively stronger in 
some firms and relatively weaker in others. Theoretical arguments were developed that 
suggest that pay-performance sensitivity that firms should (or, would) adopt could be 
industry-specific and could further depend on factors such as firm idiosyncratic and market 
risks, ownership structure, organisational strategy, and corporate governance 
characteristics. This prompted empirical researchers to look for moderator effects to the pay-
performance relationship: contingent factors that increase or decrease pay-performance 
sensitivity (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Tosi et al, 2000). More recent developments 
in the empirical literature on pay-performance sensitivity include studies that examine the 
following groups of moderator effects: (1) institutional ownership and the effects of different 
types of institutional investors on PPS; (2) the effect of formal board characteristics such as 
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board independence; (3) the role of director networks and the use of external consultants; 
and (4) the effect of external factors such as changes in regulation.  
 
Institutional Ownership:  A vast empirical literature supports the view that large 
institutional shareholders have the potential to influence CEO decisions. As the incentives to 
influence the management and the firm strategy rise with investor’s equity at stake, large 
institutional shareholders with appropriate skill are expected to influence the pay setting 
process. Hartzel and Starks (2003) find that concentrated institutional ownership is, on 
average, associated with higher pay-performance sensitivity and lower levels of pay. Recent 
analysis also suggests that not all institutions are equally good at making their voice heard 
and helps classify institutions into relatively more “active” and more “passive” owners. For 
instance, Almazan, Hartzel and Starks (2005) find that independent investment advisors and 
investment company managers are better monitors and are associated with stronger pay-for-
performance than banks and insurance companies. Shin and Seo (2011) also show that 
mutual funds and public pension funds are associated with different levels of PPS in the 
firms that they invest, which indicates further heterogeneity among institutional owners. 
Studies further show that transient institutions with high portfolio turnover are more likely to 
be focused on short-term financial performance (e.g. quarterly earnings), more likely to be 
passive in matters of corporate governance and more likely to prefer ‘exit’ over ‘voice’. 
 
Boards: Pay research documents that pay outcomes are determined, in part, and in 
a variety of different contexts, by the quality of the board. Other things equal, CEOs’ ability to 
influence their own pay is expected to be stronger when boards are weaker and CEOs are 
stronger. For instance, evidence suggests that weaker boards tend to reward CEOs for lucky 
events outside of CEOs’ control more often than stronger boards do (Bertrand & 
Mullainathan, 2001; Garvey and Milbourn, 2006). In particular, separation of the roles of 
CEO and Chairman, a high proportion of non-executive directors, and effective and 
independent nomination and remuneration sub-committees are expected to be associated 
with more robust pay-setting process.  
It might seem counterintuitive, but empirical studies of the effects of board 
independence on CEO pay and pay for performance, in particular, are mixed and 
inconclusive. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, (1999) find that board independence, as 
measured by the proportion of non-executive directors, is associated with lower levels of 
CEO pay. Rayan and Wiggins (2004) report that board independence is associated with 
stronger pay-performance links. By contrast, Renneboog and Zhao (2011) find, with a large 
dataset that covers all listed UK companies from 1996-2007, that board independence is 
both positively correlated with CEO total pay and with year-on-year changes in CEO pay, 
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while controlling for market and accounting performance. Using a sample of FTSE 350 firms 
from 2002-2008, Goh and Gupta (2011) find that board independence is associated with 
higher levels of CEO salary, bonuses, and with higher levels of equity-based pay. It is 
possible that more independent boards find it difficult to monitor CEO actions and opt for 
high-powered incentives as a substitute for monitoring by granting more equity-based pay. In 
order to compensate CEOs for bearing high firm-specific risk that comes with options and 
shares, the boards have to increase CEO salary proportionally. Indeed, the literature 
suggests that non-executive directors may lack the incentives and skill to monitor CEOs and 
may depend on the CEOs for key information (Ezzamel and Watson, 2005). A further point is 
that both CEO compensation and the board’s independence are, in part, outcomes of a 
bargaining game between the CEO and the board. If both pay and board independence are 
driven by some third unobserved factor such as CEO past performance, an empirical 
correlation between pay and board characteristics does not indicate a true causal 
relationship (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998).   
In contrast, there emerged a relatively stronger consensus across a large body of 
empirical literature on the effects of CEO-Chairman duality on pay outcomes. The separation 
of the positions of Chairman and CEO is associated with stronger penalties for poor 
performance – Franks, Mayer, and Renneboog (2001) report that UK CEOs that combine 
CEO/Chairman titles are rarely dismissed for poor financial performance. Buck et al (2003) 
find that CEO pay-performance sensitivity is lower when CEO/Chairman titles are combined. 
Finally, the recent meta-analysis of available literature strongly suggests that CEO-Chairman 
duality is associated with higher CEO pay (van Essen et al, 2015).  
    
Director networks: By serving as a non-executive director in other firms, CEOs 
accumulate connections and grow networks. Renneboog and Zhao (2011) examine the 
influence of director networks on CEO pay in the UK. On the one hand, well-connected 
boards may, potentially, use social relationships to gather relevant information on the quality 
of prospective CEOs and benefit from a spread of best management practice through the 
director network (Larcker, So, and Wang, 2013) including information on pros and cons of 
alternative incentive pay contracts. A large network may also reflect directors’ reputation and 
past experience and success in other firms. These positive characteristics can be valuable to 
firms and, as such, should command a premium on CEO labour market. On the other hand, 
networks of executive directors could be a mechanism of managerial power accumulation 
vis-à-vis their boards and could benefit self-serving CEOs. Available evidence also suggests 
that well-connected directors that serve on three or more boards at the same time as non-
executives (“busy directors”) are poor monitors. Using a large panel data over the period 
1996-2007, Renneboog and Zhao report a number of interesting and relevant findings. First, 
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they show that CEOs that have large networks (i.e. serve on many boards) enjoy larger pay 
with lower pay-performance sensitivity. This result supports the rent-extraction, or 
managerial power view of networks. Secondly, CEOs with relatively more “central” position 
in the broad director network (as proxied by a reciprocal to the average number of degrees 
of separation to other directors) enjoy larger pay with higher pay-performance sensitivity. 
The authors interpret this result as evidence that firms value CEOs with well-connected 
networks and are ready to pay a premium for well-connected boards. 
 
External Consultants: Empirical studies document a growing use of compensation 
consultants in pay-setting process. UK-listed firms are required to report the use of 
compensation consultants since 2003. Conyon, Peck, and Sadler (2009) find that the use of 
pay consultants is associated with higher levels of total CEO pay and with stronger reliance 
on equity-based pay. By contrast, Goh and Gupta (2010) investigate instances when firms 
change compensation consultants. They report that CEO pay is both higher and less 
sensitive to performance in the year when the change is reported. The researchers interpret 
this result as a manifestation of “opinion shopping” on the part of the firms that use 
consultants in search for ways to legitimise higher CEO pay.  
  
Shareholder voting or “Say on Pay” (UK): As a result of a series of regulatory 
reforms and initiatives, the UK Corporate Governance Code now enforces a greater degree 
of transparency and disclosure in reporting pay arrangements. Disclosure helps reduce 
monitoring costs and should help maintain greater shareholder scrutiny that feeds relevant 
information to the market. The Directors Remuneration Report regulations, introduced in 
2002, required boards of directors to hold a non-binding shareholder vote at the firm’s 
Annual General Meeting on the subject of executive pay. The idea behind the non-binding 
vote is, arguably, that the very public nature of the vote could help the market send a clear 
message of confidence, or lack of thereof, in the boards’ remuneration strategy. A threat of a 
public scandal and the risk of a (likely negative) market reaction should arguably constrain 
some of the more direct means by which CEOs could inflate their pay and extract rents. 
A small but growing number of empirical research have expressed concerns with the 
general effectiveness of “Say on Pay” reforms in the UK. First, Conyon and Sadler (2010) 
report that shareholder dissent on pay resolutions is low - only ten percent of votes or less 
vote against or abstain. Secondly, shareholder dissent on pay resolutions appears to be 
driven more by general concerns about firm performance rather than by their issues with 
pay. Thirdly, empirical evidence suggests that shareholder dissent does not reduce 
subsequent pay awards (also see Gregory-Smith and Main (2014), for a discussion of the 
introduction of binding shareholder vote).   
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Further research on “Say on Pay” will undoubtedly help us get a more detailed view 
on the effectiveness of this regulation. Of course, if shareholders use pay resolution votes as 
a coordination mechanism to signal their frustrations and concerns with broad issues such 
as poor performance, - this is not necessarily a bad outcome (even if unexpected). It is, 
therefore, encouraging that available evidence suggests that the introduction of “Say on Pay” 
legislation strengthened empirical sensitivity of CEO pay to instances of poor performance 
(Ferri and Maber, 2013).  
 
Understanding the Diversity of Empirical Results: Some Methodological Notes 
A noticeable feature of the empirical literature on the pay-performance relationship is its 
diversity in terms of the degrees of sensitivity or elasticity. To some extent, of course, this 
reflects the vagaries of the markets under scrutiny, such as the problems of talent 
identification and measurement, unevenness in the degree to which such issues are 
manifested across different markets and institutional contexts and cross-market differentials 
in the influence of moderating factors. To a significant degree, also, it reflects the diversity of 
empirical approaches, in particular in terms of the detail of method applied to the 
interrogation of the pay-performance relationship. There are a number of specific issues 
which have served to exemplify and explain methodological diversity. One relates to the 
valuation of state-contingent pay components, such as the absence of a widely-accepted 
basis for measuring the interim value of executive share options or long-term incentive plans 
(LTIPs) prior to maturity. With share options, a common default has been to use the Black-
Scholes valuation model, though this was originally developed in relation to the valuation of 
tradable and short-term  (generally three months) options, rather than the non-tradable and 
much longer (normally seven years) executive share option. Interim valuation of LTIPs is 
more problematic, with value often dependant on the performance of large numbers of peer 
companies and/or market indices. Another enduring issue for this type of study relates to the 
direction of causality in the pay-performance relationship, where there are strong arguments 
for suggesting both that pay structures are designed to incentivise performance and that 
performance determines pay outcomes. Disentangling these effects reliably is problematic 
and different ways of addressing this issue generate understandable differences in results. 
Further issues include the appropriate level of analysis, with studies focusing, respectively, 
on the CEO and the board as an entity. Again, this variation accounts for some of the 
differences in reported effect. Another area where researchers have been required to use 
their ingenuity in dealing with an empirical issue relates to their response to imperfect data 
availability. With variability in reporting practice across companies and jurisdictions, there is 
equally variation in the way that investigators deal with unevenness in data.   
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The Evolving Agenda: New Strands of Empirical Enquiry 
Whilst the diversity of empirical findings may have been a factor in sustaining interest in pay-
performance studies through the latter part of the twentieth century, there has, in the last 
decade, been a noticeable slowing in the rate of empirical enquiry into the pay-performance 
relationship. This reflects, in part, a degree of fatigue with further replication of what had 
become a relatively standard approach. In part, too, it reflected the reality of weak equity 
markets in the first decade of this century, which meant that stock-based compensation lost 
some of its lustre as a pay component.  
 
The academic agenda in relation to executive compensation continues to develop, however, 
with a number of new strands of enquiry emerging. In the context of economies 
characterised by recession and early and/or gradual recovery, there has been increased 
focus on sustained high absolute levels of pay for senior executives and on the differential 
between CEO/senior executive pay and median organisational pay level 
There is also a growing realisation that generating a richer understanding of pay outcomes 
demands that we embrace more thoroughly the complexity of pay-setting arrangements. 
This involves exploring the idiosyncrasies of process, the organisational politics of pay 
setting and the power relationships which help to explain pay outcomes.  In this vein, recent 
work by Skovoroda and Bruce (2013) investigates the significance of performance peer 
group composition and in particular, changes to peer group composition, in determining 
reward based on stock-based compensation. Their findings are suggestive of deliberate 
manipulation of peer groups to soften performance targets, favouring the rent extraction 
perspective. 
Equally, there is also an increasing understanding that stock-based pay components may 
affect other aspects of corporate behaviour apart from those which impact directly on 
performance. As such, one question which has received increasing recent attention is how 
reward systems which feature a high degree of stock-based compensation affect executives’ 
risk appetites and companies’ risk profiles. This relates to the view that comprehensive 
alignment of managers’ and shareholders’ objectives must embrace alignment of risk 
preferences (Murphy, 1999). As argued by Lambert et al (1991) and Hall and Murphy (2002), 
shareholders with opportunities for diversified portfolios are relatively risk neutral compared 
with firms’ senior executives, who typically have specific human capital investments in a 
company, alongside significant  wealth in the form of company-specific equity resulting in 
their over-exposure to company risk.   
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A well-established theoretical attraction of stock-based compensation is its potential to 
reduce managerial conservatism by effecting closer correlation between the risk preferences 
of relatively risk-loving shareholders and those of relatively risk-averse executives.  With its 
associated convex wealth/ stock price function (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Rajgopal and 
Shevlin, 2002), stock-based pay elements may dominate the offsetting influence of risk-
averse executives’ concave utility functions, incentivising their commitment to value-adding 
projects which they would otherwise be inclined to reject in the absence of this form of pay 
component. Hall and Murphy’s (2002) certainty-equivalent framework urges caution as to the 
net effect, however, suggesting that the effect of options on CEO risk-seeking is ambiguous. 
The certainty-equivalent framework also highlights the difference between the risk-neutral 
(Black-Scholes) and risk-adjusted valuations of ESOs to the CEOs, with the difference 
between the two valuations arising from CEO risk-aversion and under-diversification. 
A recent and related development in the literature relating risk to stock-based compensation 
has been closer attention to the effect of stock-based compensation on the composition of 
firm risk; specifically, on the relative appetite for idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk. Here, 
idiosyncratic risk relates to risk associated with aspects of firm specific activity, whereas 
systematic risk, conventionally measured by the firm’s beta, is that associated more 
generally with firms within a particular industry, market or sector, more or less broadly 
defined. An important consideration here is that CEOs, and executives more generally, are 
in a position to trade the broader market more freely, and/or at lower cost than they can their 
own companies’ stock, where contractual or regulatory restrictions invariably apply (Jin, 
2002; Garvey and Milbourn, 2003; Kahl et al, 2003; Tian, 2004; Henderson, 2005; Duan and 
Wei, 2005; Acharya and Bisin, 2009; Gao, 2010; Armstrong and Vashistha, 2012). 
Thus, un-hedged risk-averse CEOs can increase the subjective risk-adjusted value of 
incentive pay by (a) hedging the systematic risk of ESOs by reducing exposure to/shorting 
the market index and (b) by increasing their firms’ betas, which also makes hedging more 
effective.  
The firm-level effect of this type of behaviour could be value-destroying if it reflects CEOs 
passing up innovative projects with higher idiosyncratic risks in favour of more standard 
projects, with market-like risks. From a shareholder perspective, this type of effect is 
unwelcome in narrowing the range of risk positions from which they can select in assembling 
their preferred portfolio.  Armstrong and Vashistha (2012) observe that preference for 
projects with high (and hedgeable) systematic risk, adversely affects shareholders in two 
ways: managerial time may be diverted towards the pursuit of systematic risk investment 
projects which do not enhance firm value and such behaviour may lead to excessive levels 
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of systematic risk in equity markets, thereby compromising risk-sharing between investors to 
the detriment of firm values. Consistent with the general theme of substitution between 
idiosyncratic and systematic risk, Armstrong and Vashistha (2012) also note a propensity for 
firms engaged in merger activity to prefer mergers which increase the combined entities’ 
systematic risk compared with alternative potential mergers which would have increased the 
idiosyncratic risk of the merged entity. 
Whilst this substitution between forms of risk might at first appear to be an altogether more 
subtle behavioural change, it is arguably one which carries profound implications not just for 
shareholders and for corporate performance and value, but for wider sectoral or broader 
market resilience. As such, managerial incentives can be seen as `an endogenous 
determinant of the extent of aggregate or economy-wide risk’ (Acharya and Bisin, 2009). 
A further more recent strand of research has explored whether high levels of stock-based 
compensation encourage executives to obfuscate, manipulate or withhold corporate data, 
with the aim of camouflaging information which could otherwise compromise gains 
associated with this form of pay element. The capacity to manipulate the reported results of 
a company via the discretionary use of reporting conventions has received significant 
empirical attention. In this context, Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) identify a link between 
the use of discretionary accruals to manipulate reported earnings and the significance of 
stock-based elements in the packages of American CEOs. They also find a correlation 
between the use of accruals and levels of option exercise and share trading, which suggests 
that manipulation forms part of a deliberate strategy by executives to capture rent from the 
company. 
Burns and Kedia (2006) investigate the relationship between CEO stock option holdings and 
the use of what they term `aggressive accounting practices’ to manipulate reported 
performance. By comparing episodes where accounting restatements were required with 
cases where original reported performance was accepted, they identify a clear and positive 
correlation between levels of stock based compensation and the incidence of restatements. 
Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson (2007) develop this line of enquiry by comparing, 
respectively, serious and less serious cases of mis-statement with cases where no 
restatement was necessary and find that options which are `deep in the money’  appear to 
be associated with enhanced incentive to mis-represent reported results. A further example 
of manipulation is earnings smoothing, where misrepresented reported figures are designed 
to increase perceptions of permanent earnings (Kirschenheiter and Melumad, 2002). More 
or less explicit in these studies is a suggestion that there may be an optimal level of stock 
based compensation, which sufficiently sharpens performance-enhancing incentive without 
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encouraging behaviours which seek to misrepresent real performance by manipulating 
reported results. Hutton et al (2003) offer a broader discussion of these types of behaviour, 
and those aspects of the governance and wider institutional environment which either 
facilitate or inhibit them.  For example, the ability of executives to manipulate or mislead is 
seen to be constrained by environmental factors such as higher levels of institutional 
investment (Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004; Cornett, Marcus and Tehranian, 2008) and the 
level of development of the capital market (Li, Morck, Yang and Yeung, 2004), as well as by 
internal factors such as the independence of the audit committee and board.  
Whilst the above studies explore behaviours which are readily identifiable as institutional 
features such as discretionary accruals, re-statements or earnings smoothing, there are, 
equally, other aspects of executive behaviour which might be influenced by remuneration 
arrangements, but which are (at least at the time) less easily identifiable. One example of 
this might be the incentive, in the short term, for stock-incentivised executives to conceal or 
withhold information deemed likely to have a negative impact on reported results. Here, Jin 
and Myers (2006) argue that whilst executives may be prepared to absorb the costs of 
inhibiting transparency in the short term, sustained underperformance can result in 
abandonment of this position, immediately prior to the release of an accumulation of 
previously concealed negative information and a violently negative market reaction. 
The above examples offer a clear indication that the research agenda in the area of 
executive reward remains vibrant, challenging and, at the same time arguably, more diverse 
and sophisticated than at any time in the last thirty years. Whilst there is always likely to be 
academic, and broader, interest in the pay-performance question, we are learning that the 
structure and form of executive pay has more profound consequences for wider corporate 
behaviour and characteristics and that investigation of the architecture and processes of pay 
determination is fertile territory for those researchers interested in executive reward and the 






Acharya, V. V., & Bisin, A. (2009). Managerial hedging, equity ownership and firm value, RAND 
Journal of Economics, 40(1), 47-77. 
 
Acharya, V. V., & Volpin, P. (2010). Corporate Governance Externalities. Review of Finance, 14(1), 1-
33. 
 
Aggarwal, R.K., & Samwick, A. A. (1999). The Other Side of the Trade-Off: The Impact of Risk on 
Executive Compensation. Journal of Political Economy, 107(1), 65-105. 
 
Almazan, A., Hartzell, J. C., & Starks, L. T. (2005). Active institutional shareholders and costs of 
monitoring: Evidence from executive compensation. Financial Management, 34(4), 5-34. 
 
Armstrong, C.S. & Vashishtha, R. (2012). Executive stock options, differential risk-taking incentives, 
and firm value. Journal of Financial Economics, 104, 70-88.  
 
Bergstresser, D., & Philippon, T. (2006). CEO incentives and earnings management. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 80(3), 511-529. 
 
Bebchuk, L. A., & Fried, J. M. (2004). Pay without performance: The unfulfilled promise of executive 
compensation. Harvard University Press. 
 
Benito, A., & Conyon, M. J. (1999). The governance of directors' pay: Evidence from UK companies. 
Journal of Management and Governance, 3(2), 117-136. 
 
Burns, N., & Kedia, S. (2006). The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 79(1), 35-67. 
 
Dicks, D. L. (2012). Executive Compensation and the Role for Corporate Governance Regulation. 
Review of Financial Studies, 25(6), 1971-2004. 
 
Barkema, H. G., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1998). Managerial Compensation and Firm Performance: A 
General Research Framework. Academy of Management Journal, 41(2), 135-145. 
 
Bebchuk, L. A., Grinstein, Y., & Peyer, U. (2010). Lucky CEOs and lucky directors. The Journal of 
Finance, 65(6), 2363-2401. 
 
Belliveau, M. A., O’Reilly, C. A., & Wade, J. B. (1996). Social capital at the top: Effects of social 
similarity and status on CEO compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 39: 1568–1593. 
 
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2001). Are CEOs rewarded for luck? The ones without principals 
are. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 901-932. 
 
Benito, A., & Conyon, M. J. (1999). The governance of directors' pay: Evidence from UK companies. 
Journal of Management and Governance, 3(2), 117-136. 
 
Bruce, A., & Skovoroda, R. (2013). Bankers’ bonuses and the financial crisis: Context, evidence and 
the rhetoric–policy gap. Business History, 55(2), 139-160. 
 
Buck, T., Bruce, A., Main, B. G., & Udueni, H. (2003). Long Term Incentive Plans, Executive Pay and 




Conyon , M. J. (1997). Institutional arrangements for setting directors’ compensation in UK 
companies, in Keasey, K., Thompson, S. & Wright, M. Corporate Governance: Economic, 
Management and Financial Issues, Oxford University Press. 
 
Conyon, M. J., & Gregg, P. (1994). Pay at the top: a study of the sensitivity of top director 
remuneration to company specific shocks. National Institute Economic Review, 149(1), 83-92. 
 
Conyon, M. J., Peck, S. I., & Sadler, G. V. (2009). Compensation consultants and executive pay: 
Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom. The Academy of Management 
Perspectives, 23(1), 43-55. 
 
Conyon, M. J., & Gregg, P. (1994). Pay at the top: a study of the sensitivity of top director 
remuneration to company specific shocks. National Institute Economic Review, 149(1), 83-92. 
 
Conyon, M. J., Peck, S. I., & Sadler, G. V. (2009). Compensation consultants and executive pay: 
Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom. The Academy of Management 
Perspectives, 23(1), 43-55. 
 
Conyon, M., & Sadler, G. (2010). Shareholder voting and directors' remuneration report legislation: 
Say on pay in the UK. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 18(4), 296-312. 
 
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999). Corporate governance, chief executive officer 
compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 51(3), 371-406. 
 
Cornett, M. M., Marcus, A. J., & Tehranian, H. (2008). Corporate governance and pay-for-
performance: The impact of earnings management. Journal of Financial Economics, 87(2), 357-373. 
 
Duan, J. & Wei, J., (2005). Executive stock options and incentive effects due to systematic risk’, 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 29, 1185-1211. 
 
Efendi, J., Files, R., Ouyang, B., & Swanson, E. P. (2013). Executive turnover following option 
backdating allegations. The Accounting Review, 88(1), 75-105. 
 
Efendi, J., Srivastava, A., & Swanson, E. P. (2007). Why do corporate managers misstate financial 
statements? The role of option compensation and other factors. Journal of Financial Economics, 
85(3), 667-708. 
 
Ertimur, Y., Ferri, F., & Maber, D. A. (2012). Reputation penalties for poor monitoring of executive 
pay: Evidence from option backdating. Journal of Financial Economics, 104(1), 118-144. 
 
Ezzamel, M., & Watson, R. 2005. Boards of directors and the role of non-executive directors in the 
governance of corporations. In Keasey, K., Thompson, S., & Wright, M. (Eds.). Corporate 
governance: accountability, enterprise and international comparisons. John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Ferri, F., & Maber, D. A. (2013). Say on pay votes and CEO compensation: Evidence from the UK. 
Review of Finance, 17(2), 527-563. 
 
Franks, J., Mayer, C., & Renneboog, L. (2001). Who disciplines management in poorly performing 
companies?. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 10(3), 209-248. 
 
Frankforter, S. A., Becton, J. B., Stanwick, P. A., & Coleman, C. (2012). Backdated stock options and 
boards of directors: An examination of committees, structure, and process. Corporate Governance: 




Frydman, C., & Jenter, D. (2010). CEO Compensation. Annual Review of Financial Economics, 2(1), 
75-102. 
 
Gabaix, X., & Landier, A. (2008). Why Has CEO Pay Increased so Much?. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 49-100. 
 
Gao, H. (2010). Optimal compensation contracts when managers can hedge. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 97, 218-238. 
 
Garvey, G., and Milbourn, T. (2003). ‘Incentive Compensation When Executives Can Hedge the 
Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section’, Journal of Finance, 58(4), 
1557-1582. 
 
Garvey, G. T., & Milbourn, T. T. (2006). Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are 
rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad. Journal of Financial Economics, 82(1), 197-225. 
 
Goh, L., & Gupta, A. (2010). Executive compensation, compensation consultants, and shopping for 
opinion: Evidence from the United Kingdom. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 25(4), 607-
643. 
 
Gregory-Smith, I., & Main, B. G. (2014). Binding Votes on Executive Remuneration. Paper presented 
at Royal Economic Society Annual Conference, Manchester, 2014. 
 
Hall, B. J., & Liebman, J. B. (1998). Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?. The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 113(3), 653-691. 
 
Hall, B. J., & Murphy, K. J. (2002). Stock options for undiversified executives. Journal of accounting 
and economics, 33(1), 3-42. 
 
Hartzell, J. C., & Starks, L. T. (2003). Institutional investors and executive compensation. The Journal 
of Finance, 58(6), 2351-2374. 
 
Hayes, R. M., & Schaefer, S. (2009). CEO pay and the Lake Wobegon effect. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 94(2), 280-290. 
 
Henderson, V. (2005). The impact of the market portfolio on the valuation, incentives and optimality of 
executive stock options. Quantitative Finance, vol. 5(1), pp. 35-47. 
 
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1998). Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their 
monitoring of the CEO. American Economic Review, 96-118. 
 
Hutton, A., Miller, G. & Skinner, D. (2003). The role of supplementary statements with management 
earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research, 41 (5), 867-890. 
 
Jensen, M., & Murphy, K. (1990). Performance pay and top-management incentives. Journal of 
Political Economy, 98 (2): 225–264. 
 
Jin, L. (2002). CEO compensation, diversification, and incentives. Journal of Financial Economics, 
vol. 66, pp. 29-63. 
 
Jin, L., & Myers, S. C. (2006). R2 around the world: New theory and new tests. Journal of Financial 




Jung, H. W., & Subramanian, A., (2015). CEO Talent, CEO Compensation and Product Market 
Competition. Allied Social Science Association Meeting, 2013; 2012 Western Finance Association 
Meeting; FIRN Research Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2187062 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2187062 
 
Kahl, M., Liu, J., & Longstaff, F. A. (2003). Paper millionaires: How valuable is stock to a stockholder 
who is restricted from selling it?. Journal of Financial Economics, 67(3), 385-410. 
 
Kirschenheiter, M., & Melumad, N. D. (2002). Can “Big Bath” and Earnings Smoothing Co‐exist as 
Equilibrium Financial Reporting Strategies?. Journal of Accounting Research, 40(3), 761-796. 
 
Kaplan, S. N., & Rauh, J. (2010). Wall Street and Main Street: What contributes to the rise in the 
highest incomes?. Review of Financial Studies, 23(3), 1004-1050. 
 
Lambert, R. A., Larcker, D. F., & Verrecchia, R. E. (1991). Portfolio considerations in valuing 
executive compensation. Journal of Accounting Research, 29(1), 129-149. 
 
Larcker, D. F., So, E. C., & Wang, C. C. (2013). Boardroom centrality and firm performance. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics, 55(2), 225-250. 
 
Lie, E. (2005). On the timing of CEO stock option awards. Management Science, 51(5), 802-812. 
 
Main, B. G., Bruce, A., & Buck, T. (1996). Total board remuneration and company performance. The 
Economic Journal, 106, 1627-1644. 
 
Main, B. G. M., & Johnston, J. (1992). The remuneration committee as an instrument of corporate 
governance, Hume Occasional Paper No. 35, David Hume Institute.  
 
Li, K., Morck, R., Yang, F. & Yeung, B. (2004). Firm specific variation and openness in emerging 
markets. Review of Economics and Statistics, 86(3), 658-669 
 
Murphy, K. J. (1999). Executive compensation. In O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (Eds.), Handbook of labor 
economics: 2485-2563. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
 
Nguyen, B. D., & Nielsen, K. M. (2014). What death can tell: Are executives paid for their 
contributions to firm value?. Management Science, 60(12), 2994-3010. 
 
Piotroski, J. D., & Roulstone, D. T. (2004). The influence of analysts, institutional investors, and 
insiders on the incorporation of market, industry, and firm-specific information into stock prices. The 
Accounting Review, 79(4), 1119-1151. 
 
Rajgopal, S. and Shevlin, T. (2002). Empirical evidence on the relation between stock option 
compensation and risk taking. Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 33, pp. 145-171. 
 
Ryan, H. E., & Wiggins, R. A. (2004). Who is in whose pocket? Director compensation, board 
independence, and barriers to effective monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 73(3), 497-524. 
 
Rosen, S. (1992). Contracts and the market for executives. In L. Werin and H. Wijkander (Eds.), 
Contract Economics, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 181-211. 
 
Renneboog, L., & Zhao, Y. (2011). Us knows us in the UK: On director networks and CEO 




Rosen, S. (1992). Contracts and the market for executives. In L. Wernin and H. Wijkander (ed.) 
Contract Economics. 
 
Skovoroda, R., & Bruce, A., (2013). Peer Groups and Performance-Based Remuneration for FTSE 
100 CEOs: analysing the impact of changes to peer group composition, at 4th European Reward 
Management Conference (RMC 2013), Managing Rewards: What can we learn from a comparative 
approach?, Brussels, December 2-3, 2013. 
 
Shin, J. Y., & Seo, J. (2011). Less Pay and More Sensitivity? Institutional Investor Heterogeneity and 
CEO Pay. Journal of Management, 37(6), 1719-1746. 
 
Terviö, M. (2008). The difference that CEOs make: An assignment model approach. The American 
Economic Review, 642-668. 
 
Terviö, M. (2009). Superstars and Mediocrities: Market Failure in the Discovery of Talent. The Review 
of economic studies, 76(2), 829-850. 
 
Tian, Y.S. (2004). Too much of a good incentive? The case of executive stock options, Journal of 
Banking & Finance, vol. 28, pp. 1225-1245. 
 
Tosi, H. L., Werner, S., Katz, J. P., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (2000). How much does performance 
matter? A meta-analysis of CEO pay studies. Journal of Management, 26(2), 301-339. 
 
van Essen, M., Otten, J., & Carberry, E. J. (2015). Assessing Managerial Power Theory: A Meta-
Analytic Approach to Understanding the Determinants of CEO Compensation. Journal of 
Management, 41(1), 164-202. 
 
Zajac, E. J., & Westphal, J. D. (1996). Director Reputation, CEO-Board Power, and the Dynamics of 
Board Interlocks. Administrative Science Quarterly, 507-529. 
 
 
 
